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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 940500-CA 
v. : 
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals a firearm enhancement of one year imposed 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990), following his 
conviction of robbery, a second degree felony, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does the term "representation of a firearm" as used in the 
firearm enhancement statute include an oral statement that one 
has a firearm? 
"'The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error.'" State 
v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 
1991) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990). 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a 
term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated 15 December 1993 
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 9-10). He pled guilty to 
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-301 (1990) (R. 27-28) . The court imposed the statutory term 
of imprisonment, including a mandatory one-year firearm 
enhancement (R. 3 0-31) . Defendant timely appealed (R. 34). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30, 1994, defendant entered a credit union, 
confronted cashier Michelle Neff, and demanded money. He said he 
had a gun and would kill her if she did not comply (R. 10, 20, 
58, 67). Defendant did not display a firearm and in fact did not 
have one, but intended to scare the cashier (R. 58). She 
believed that he had a gun and gave him $2,000 (R. 58, 67). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At issue on this appeal is whether the statutory phrase 
"the representation of a firearm" as used in the firearm 
enhancement statute includes an oral statement that the 
perpetrator has a firearm. 
Defendant waived this claim below by assuring the trial 
court that it had "discretion" to impose a firearm enhancement. 
However, it is clear from statements by the sponsor of the 
passage at issue that the Utah Legislature intended to enhance 
the sentence of a person who, like defendant, "represents that he 
has a firearm." The rule of lenity has no application where, as 
here, the intent of the legislature is apparent. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TERM "REPRESENTATION OF A FIREARM" AS USED IN THE 
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE INCLUDES AN ORAL 
REPRESENTATION THAT THE PERPETRATOR HAS A FIREARM 
At issue on this appeal is whether the statutory phrase "the 
representation of a firearm" includes an oral statement that the 
perpetrator has a firearm, or whether some physical likeness of a 
firearm is required. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990), a person 
convicted of a second degree felony is subject to sentence 
enhancements "if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
3 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony" (emphasis added)-1 
The trial court here imposed an additional one-year prison 
term. It reasoned that although defendant did not employ an 
actual firearm or physical facsimile, he made an oral 
representation of a firearm, which satisfies the statute where 
the victim believes the representation and thus "the fear is 
still there" (R. 51). 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in construing 
the term "representation" to include his oral statement to the 
cashier that he had a gun. Br. of Appellant at 9. 
A. Defendant waived this claim by assuring the 
district court imposition of a firearms enhancement 
was within its discretion. 
Defendant waived his challenge to the firearm enhancement by 
pleading guilty with the express understanding that the firearm 
enhancement could be imposed and informing the trial court that 
imposing the enhancement was within the court's discretion. 
Defendant's guilty plea was unconditional. As part of the 
plea process, defendant ,and his counsel signed a Statement of 
Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and Order (R. 19-25, addendum 
A). In that document, defendant states that the punishment for 
the crime to which he is pleading guilty includes a gun 
1
 A consecutive one-year term is mandatory; an additional 
consecutive term not to exceed five years is discretionary. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-2-3(2) (1990). 
4 
enhancement of one to five years (R. 19). The document also 
states that the prosecution will not seek the enhancement (id.). 
At the plea hearing, defense counsel argued that the fact 
that defendant did not actually possess a firearm was a 
mitigating factor for the judge to consider in sentencing. She 
stated, "But Mr. Candelario is now aware, and it has been 
included on this [written statement], that the Court must impose 
one year if you find certain things, and it can be a 
discretionary five" (R. -57-58) . She also conceded "that the 
enhancement could conceivably apply" (R. 60; see also 61). The 
court later told defendant that the mandatory nature of the 
firearm enhancement "does not preclude your attorney on your 
behalf from suggesting to me that legally it does not apply in 
this case" (R. 63). 
However, at sentencing defense counsel did not argue that 
the absence of an actual weapon made the firearm enhancement 
illegal, only that it made the enhancement discretionary. When 
the court observed that the absence of a weapon "doesn't change 
the necessity of imposing an enhancement of a firearm," defense 
counsel replied in part, "I leave that to your discretion" (R. 
49). The court pressed the point: 
THE COURT: The firearms enhancement applies if a 
person makes a representation that they have a firearm, 
even if they do not. 
MS. WELLS: It does for purposes of elevating the 
offense to aggravated robbery, yes. For purposes of an 
enhancement, I think that that is less clear, and 
becomes discretionary. 
5 
(R. 49-50).2 
ff[0]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993). Having repeatedly assured the trial court that it had 
discretion to impose a firearms enhancement, defendant cannot on 
appeal insist that the court committed error by imposing it. 
In addition, defendant failed to preserve in the trial court 
the legal theory he now advocates. Defendant below consistently 
relied on the distinction between a perpetrator with a firearm 
and one without (R. 49, 50, 51, 57). On appeal, defendant 
abandons that distinction and implicitly concedes that an actual 
firearm is unnecessary under the statute. See, e.g., Br. of 
Appellant at 11-12. Instead, he urges that the proper 
distinction is between physical representations and verbal 
representations. 
Where an appellant failed to assert a particular ground for 
relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider 
that ground on appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
1985) (refusing to entertain warrantless search argument when 
suppression was sought on other grounds in the trial court); Mel 
2
 "Threatening to use a dangerous weapon during the 
commission of a robbery, regardless of whether one actually 
possesses such a weapon, is sufficient for a charge of aggravated 
robbery under section 76-6-302." State v. Adams, 83 0 P.2d 310, 
(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544, 
547 (Utah 1989)) . 
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Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 
455-56 & n.4 (Utah App.) (appellate court would not consider 
argument raised for first time on appeal "for the purpose of 
reversing the trial court" even though it might have done so "if 
doing so would permit affirmance " ) , cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 
(Utah 1988). This court should accordingly refuse to consider 
defendant's claim on appeal. 
However, were this Court to reach defendant's claim, it 
would find it to be without merit. 
B. The Legislature intended to enhance the sentence of 
one who orally represents that he has a firearm. 
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 
111, 115 (Utah 1991) . The only purpose of rules of statutory 
construction is to assist courts in performing that task. Cullum 
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993). 
The construing court begins with the plain language of the 
statute, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993), 
looking to the usually accepted meanings of those terms and 
assuming that each was used advisedly and meant "literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." 
Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 
(Utah 1991). 
When the statutory language is ambiguous, the court looks to 
legislative history and other sources to ascertain legislative 
7 
intent. P.I.E. Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 
1151 (Utah 1988) . 
1. The statute's plain language is ambiguous. 
Defendant initially claims that the plain language of the 
enhancement statute resolves this appeal in his favor. Br. of 
Appellant at 9-13. On the contrary, the plain language of the 
statute comfortably accommodates the trial court's reading. 
Utah courts frequently turn to Black's Law Dictionary for 
guidance on the meaning of common terms used in the Utah Code or 
court rules. See, e.g., Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach, 714 P.2d 
1147, 1148 (Utah 1986) ("child" as used in § 35-1-71); Mt. 
Olympus Waters, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271, 
1274 (Utah App.) ("any" as used in § 59-12-104(24)), cert. 
denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994); State v. One 1979 Pontiac 
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah App. 1989) ("bona fide" as used 
in § 58-37-13); State v. Wright, 765 P.2d 12, 20 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Garff, J., concurring) ("or" as used in Utah R. Evid. 
609(a) (2)) . 
The same is true for Ballentine's Law Dictionary. See, 
e.g., State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1987) 
("facsimile" as used in § 76-6-302 (1) (a)); State v. Durrant, 561 
P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah 1977) ("criminal negligence" as used in § 
76-5-201(1)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Chavez, 605 
P.2d 1226, 1228 (1979) . 
8 
Black's Law Dictionary's first definition of representation 
is "[a]ny conduct capable of being turned into a statement of 
fact." Black's Law Dictionary 1301 (6th ed. 1990). Ballentine's 
Law Dictionary's first definition of representation is "[a] 
statement of fact, truthful or untruthful." Ballentine's Law 
Dictionary 1095 (3d ed. 1969). Neither mentions the definition 
that defendant urges, a "likeness, image, picture, etc." Br. of 
Appellant at 10-11. 
Since the most common meaning of "representation" as used in 
the law is "a statement of fact," the phrase "representation of a 
firearm" as used in section 76-3-203(2) may be read as the trial 
court read it, to include defendant's false statement that he had 
a gun. Consequently, assuming defendant's reading of the term 
representation is a possible reading, the statute is at the very 
least ambiguous. 
2. The legislature intended to enhance the sentence of 
one who "represents that he has a firearm.11 
The statute's legislative history resolves the ambiguity in 
its wording. The language at issue here was proposed by Senator 
Rinstrom during the 1976 Utah legislative budget session: 
Sen. Rinstrom: Now, Mr. President, a second motion I would 
have to amend this bill as follows is again in 
those same places, calling your attention to 
line 18 after the word "firearm," add these 
words: "or a facsimile or the representation of 
the same was used in the commission of a 
felony." 
Mr. President: Or a facsimile or what? 
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Sen. Rinstrom: "or a facsimile or the representation of the 
same." Now, let me give you the example of 
where I'm going. Sorry to report I represented 
a young man on an armed robbery charge. I was 
successful in finding him innocent. He later 
was arrested on a second one and confessed to 
eighteen armed robberies including the one that 
I had represented him on, and he'd all done it 
[sic] with a cap pistol. But the people at the 
other end of that barrel didn't know what they 
were facing, and they were just as in great 
[sicl a shock and trauma as if a real gun had 
been pointed to them. So I think that we ought 
to include a facsimile. Or, this would also 
include the man who has his hand in his pocket 
and points it at you and says, "I have a gun 
here, and if you don't hand over the cash, I'm 
going to shoot you." So, what this amendment 
would do is saying [sic] that if a person uses 
a gun, its facsimile, or represents that he has 
a firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an 
additional five years. That's the purpose of 
the amendment. 
Senate Budget Session, Senate Floor Debate on House Bill 3, 
January 26, 1976 at 1-2 (addendum B, emphasis added). 
Two points emerge from this statement. First, Senator 
Rinstrom stated that he intended the amendment to enhance the 
sentence of a person who "represents that he has a firearm." He 
used the term "represents" in the sense of making "a statement of 
fact," Black's Law Dictionary at 1301; Ballentine's Law 
Dictionary at 1095, the statement being, of course, that the 
person has a firearm. Displaying a physical likeness of a gun, 
such as a finger in the pocket, is one way of representing that 
you have a firearm, but it is not the only way. Words will also 
suffice. 
10 
Second, the stated purpose of the amendment was to protect 
victims from the "shock and trauma" caused by believing they 
might be shot. The district court here divined this legislative 
purpose, stating: "I can't see a dime's worth of difference if 
you're the person standing there being robbed where a person 
represents they have a firearm, or[,] whether or not it's 
displayed, they believe you, the fear is still there" (R. 51, 
emphasis added). 
Defendant's admission to police that he wanted to "scare" 
the teller demonstrates .that he intended to inflict the precise 
harm that the legislature sought to protect against. Therefore, 
construing the statutory term representation to include verbal 
representations such as defendant's advances the purpose of the 
statute.3 
Defendant's insistence that the firearm enhancement statute 
may be invoked only if the perpetrator uses a physical likeness 
of a gun would frustrate this legislative purpose. One robber 
might hold his finger up in his coat pocket and say, "Hand over 
the money or I'll shoot." Another might simply have his hand in 
his coat pocket (without making any likeness of a gun) and say, 
"I have a gun in my pocket. Hand over the money or I'll shoot." 
3
 The legislature's desire to protect innocent persons from 
terrifying threats, "whether or not the perpetrator actually 
possesses a weapon," is a legitimate one. State v. Hartmann, 783 
P.2d 544, 546-47 (Utah 1989) (holding that a verbal threat alone 
satisfies the phrase "threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon" as used in the aggravated burglary statute). 
11 
Under defendant's analysis, the first robber's sentence would be 
enhanced, but the second robber's sentence would not. 
There is nothing in the legislative history of the amendment 
to suggest that the legislature intended this absurd result. See 
Anderson v. Utah County, 368 P.2d 912, (Utah 1962) (stating 
that court may consult legislative history to avoid absurd 
construction of ambiguous statute). Certainly the "shock and 
trauma" Senator Rinstrom sought to protect against are present 
equally in either case. 
Defendant relies on the fact that the amendment's framers 
discussed whether or under what circumstances pointing a finger 
could constitute a representation. Br. of Appellant at 15-16. 
However, the hypothetical was not resolved on whether a physical 
likeness was created, as defendant suggests, but on whether or 
not "a reasonable man, if he was seeing that, would . . . 
conclude that you had a firearm." Senate Budget Session, Senate 
Floor Debate on House Bill 3, January 26, 1976 at 2 (addendum B). 
There can be no doubt that defendant here "represent[ed] 
that he ha[d] a firearm." As such, his conduct fell within the 
intent of the drafters of the firearm enhancement provision.4 
4
 This conclusion is consistent with Utah case law. In 
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court 
held that a finger in a coat pocket accompanied by verbal threats 
to kill the robbery victim did not constitute use of "a firearm 
or a facsimile of a firearm" under the aggravated robbery statute 
then in effect, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). Id. at 965. 
However, the terms representation or represents were not at 
issue. 
12 
C. The rule of lenity does not apply here. 
Finally, defendant relies on the "well established rule of 
lenity," which dictates that statutory ambiguity be resolved in 
favor of lenity and against the harsher of two possible 
punishments. Br. of Appellant at 16-17; see State v. Egbert, 748 
P.2d 558, 562 n.3 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting).5 
1. Defendant failed to preserve this issue. 
Defendant failed to preserve this legal theory in the 
district court, where he never mentioned or argued it. 
Where an appellant fails to assert a particular ground for 
relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider 
that ground on appeal. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660; Mel Trimble Real 
Estate, 758 P.2d at 456 & n.4. Therefore, defendant is not 
entitled to rely on the rule of lenity to seek reversal here. 
See State v. Eason, 470 A.2d 688, 694 (Conn. 1984) (declining to 
reach a claim of lenity that "was not raised by the defendant 
when he entered his guilty plea" or "during the sentencing 
hearing"), overruled on other grounds by Paulsen v. Manson, 525 
A.2d 1315, 1318 (Conn. 1987). 
5
 It is unclear how "well established" the rule of lenity 
is in Utah. It has been cited only twice by Utah courts. It was 
cited in dissent in Egbert, 748 P.2d at 562 n.3, and it was 
discussed but not applied in State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 86-87 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
13 
2. The rule of lenity may not be invoked to 
frustrate legislative intent. 
The rule of lenity "is a rule of statutory construction to 
be applied only when [legislative] intent is ambiguous." 
Castaldi v. United States, 783 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986); accord, State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 86-87 (Utah App. 1990) (refusing to apply rule of lenity 
where history of amendments to aggravated robbery statute 
"evinces the legislature's intent"); Simpson v. United States, 
435 U.S. 6, 13-15 (1978) (invoking lenity only after examining 
legislative history); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 
(1958) (invoking the rule of lenity where statutory construction 
"can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended"). Thus, the rule of lenity "operates only where there 
is no contrary legislative intent." State v. Pierce, 895 P.2d 
25, 26 (Wash. App. 1995). 
Here, the history of section 76-5-203(2) demonstrates that 
the legislature intended the term representation to include oral 
as well as physical representations. See supra point B.2. 
Therefore, resort to the rule of lenity here is unnecessary and 
would frustrate the clear intent of the legislature, which it is 
the duty of the judicial branch to effectuate. See State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 485 (Utah 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Court should affirm the trial 
court's imposition of the sentence enhancement. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
In the event a reply brief is filed, the State requests oral 
argument. Otherwise, no argument is necessary to resolve this 
appeal. Similarly, if this court agrees with the State that 
defendant invited or failed to preserve the error he claims on 
appeal, no written opinion is necessary. Otherwise, a written 
opinion interpreting the fi rear in. enhancement stati it€ 
useful addition to Utah case law. 
V ( July 1! RESPECTFULLY submitted on 995 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
sistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
District (Jour 
State of Utah 
Lake County 
'I HI. MATE Of I MAR 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
i.^L^ fA^-UL / 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No. W W *3&F~S 
COMES NOW, m, the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s): 
A. 
B. 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
- „> 
DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
min/max and/or 
* *- Min. Mandatory ,. 
/ i i . W I— • <— 
-^/ . 
~^  
_Likk_L •OKI V)-' \^y/hXA\A 
t — _ - ^^ „ — « 
z^& Si I 
z :^ 
^ g^->/. '-V ^ ~\ 
// / 7 ^ < L ^uof /Q<LeJ^ OJJutZ^^^ 
DPA4 tt^SLZ 4- *£^>xJ\^^LCA^'Ui/Cf, 
t00T9 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s){for which J*am pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). JJ '''7 /• ' ^ ' " 
( • • ' - - " .• 
The elements of the crimefs) of which I am charged are as follows: ^-* -'• - --' • 
(L A - ' ^ 7 '';.4.1 {' l i * ' \ /-~r
 t .".'s^' <-y.S •/'.' 
Mywconduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged arenas follows: 
• ^ / 
.-.: ~/-:JJ/> L / , -i / / ' / / / 
T 
•?V- ' ; ^v:^r^<X / > - , ^ A W T < / y 
l:/^ * • Pi J ': / / :^V ; • 'U-'zLsrs ? ( '-' -. r ^ / / , . . ,. _ _ ^ > : 
fX'Ltti;> A / / ; ; -;\j'ji.._f:T. _ / ^ ,%-> ^ 
" 7 " 
'
 u y n m entering this/these pleats) vouintarily and With knowledge and understanding of 
the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize 
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by 
the Court, to recoup thexost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel . If I have waived my right to 
counsel, I have done~so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
2 
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and under-
stand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my pil'cu oil |"unlf\ ' ^ 
,4. J f I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ^ ' '' • 
I -'L ' "V / / •'', . and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my ri^.Ms and 
the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and uoss-
examnir < \-ilnesses against nut; or to have them «t "toss-examined by my attorney. 1 also know 
that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court 
in my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do 
so I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences 
will be di awn against, i i ic if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial, At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a 
jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. 1 know thai unuku the Constitution of Utah 1 . were tried and convicted 
I or llbv the judge th.ii! 1 would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could 
not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which 
I plead (guilty) (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an offense that 
carries a minimum mandatory sentei ice tl lat I v< ill be subjectin I 
mandatory sentence foi that offense, I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may 
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be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%]) 
(eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amount, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted 
or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this 
plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of/tguilty) (no 
contest), I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or 
sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not biding on the judge. I 
also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are 
also not binding on the Court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement, have been made to me. 
i 
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I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in 
this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. 1 an i -V / years of age; 1 ha \ - e attended school throi igh the grade ai id 
I can read ai id understand the English language or <MI interpreter has been provided to me. I 
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the coi iseqi lences of my plea, and free of any mental 
disease, defect or impairmeni thdl would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this ./ - / day of / /' ' "'U. \9}0 
DEFEND A! 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify ••: . <::••. !''JS- UvLl< (L _j '(-t.JU I. the defendant 
a v i statement or that I have read it to him/her and I 
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
0 f ) f l 9 Q 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representa-
tions and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
• '• C » ' ' •••• 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
/ /•' J 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against. 
/. &•'•-''- - */-*-. '~-''~'-< defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that 
the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. 
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) 
is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public injereSt? 
PROSECUTING ATT 
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ORDER 
Based upon tl ite facts set nnili mi iiitt nursl ing slateiIICIIt ami the lenifkauon r>( (lit 
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and fines the defendant's plea(s) of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is >o ordered that the defendant's 
plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set fortlyn the statement be accepted and 
entered. 
IH INI IN l 'OMPT HIM. _?Z. day ol , / V ^ * ^ 
'/*£—- m 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM B 
LEGISLATIVE FLOOR DEBATE ON 
HOUSE BILL 3 
Lavs of Utah 1976, Ch. 9, § 1 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203) 
SENATE DEBATE 
SENATE BUDGET SESSION 
DAY 15—JANUARY 26, 1976 
SENATOR RINSTROM'S SECOND AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 3 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Nov, Mr. President, a second motion I would 
have to amend this bill as follows is again 
in those same places, calling your attention 
to line 18 after the word "firearm," add 
these words: "or a facsimile or the 
representation of the same was used in the 
commission or furtherance of a felony." 
Or a facsimile or what? 
"or a facsimile or the representation of the 
same." Now, let me give you the example of 
where I'm going. Sorry to report I 
represented a young man on an armed robbery 
charge. I was successful in finding him 
innocent. He later was arrested on a second 
one and confessed to eighteen armed robberies 
including the one that I had represented him 
on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol. 
But the people at the other end of that 
barrel didn't know what they were facing, and 
they were just as in great a shock and trauma 
as if a real gun had been pointed to them. 
So I think that we ought to include a 
facsimile. Or, this would also include the 
man who has his hand in his pocket and points 
it at you and says, "I have a gun here, and 
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to 
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do 
is saying that if a person uses a gun, its 
facsimile, or represents that he has a 
firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an 
additional five years. That's the purpose of 
the amendment. 
Senator Brockbank. 
1 
Sen. Brockbank: 
Mr. President: 
(inaudible) representation of same to 
representation of a firearm. 
That's good. That's a good suggestion. 
Sen. Brockbank: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Brockbank: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Because I think you might refer back to a 
facsimile. 
That's right. That's right. 
(inaudible) to firearms. 
And the representation of a firearm. 
And that will also have to go into all three 
places? 
That's correct. 
Okay. That carries a bit more significance 
than the other one, I would think, if it 
(inaudible) some gesture on the part of the 
person as opposed to carrying a real firearm. 
I might say that this bill does not deal just 
with robberies. It's the commission of any 
felony in which a firearm would be used, a 
facsimile or the representation. 
Would this be a representation. 
I don't think if you pointed your finger at 
me that that would be a representation. 
But— 
It might look like a gun— 
Well-
to somebody in the dark. 
I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing 
that, would not conclude that you had a 
firearm. If you came up behind me at night 
and stuck your finger in your back and said, 
"This is a gun. If you don't hand me your 
wallet, I'm going to shoot you," that would 
be a representation, yes. 
2 
Mr. President: Any further discussion on the motion? All in 
favor of the motion say, "aye." 
Body: Aye. 
Mr. President: Opposed, "no." 
Body: No. 
Mr. President: The motion carries. If there are no further 
questions, then I have a question I want to 
ask you, but before I do, Senator Howell. 
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